The competitive implications of the ability of firms to trade in transparent forward markets has received considerable attention in the academic literature. These implications have not had much impact on policy however. In this paper I examine the implications of forward contracts on oligopoly environments by extending the model of Allaz and Vila to an environment with multiple firms and increasing marginal cost. I then take estimates of key parameters of this model from existing electricity markets to predict the market impact of one round of public contracting, such as those seen in auctions for retail provision and resource procurement. The results imply that the importance of supplier concentration is magnified when forward contracts are present.
Under traditional competition policy, the evaluation of horizontal market power begins with an assessment of horizontal structure. Relatively simple measures of horizontal concentration, such as the Herfindahl index, still play an important role. Much of the intellectual grounding and practical implementation of competition policy goes further to consider the implications of equilibrium oligopoly models. Beyond an assessment of horizontal structure, there are many mitigating factors to consider, such as cost-reducing synergies and the potential for learning and innovation.
Another potentially important element to consider that has not received as much attention in anti-trust circles is the prevalence of fixed-price forward contracting in an industry. Starting with the work of Allaz and Vila (1988) , a line of theoretical work has explored the extent to which the existence of forward markets can impact competition in oligopolistic markets. Much of this work has focused on the electricity industry, in part because it features three elements present in the Allaz and Vila model, oligopoly suppliers, homogenous commodity products, and robust forward markets. 1 Empirical research on the electricity industry also indicates the extent of forward contracting by suppliers has been an important determinant in the competitive performance of specific markets. 2 
Forward obligations have generally been ignored by anti-trust authorities, but the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission is proposing changes to its horizontal market power screens that would account for such commitments. 3 Despite the empirical and theoretical examination of the Allaz and Vila framework, relatively little insight has been developed about the implications of their model for general oligopoly environments. In this paper, I extend the model of Allaz and Vila, which features 2 firms and constant marginal cost, to accomodate a general number of oligopolists and increasing marginal costs. Both of these features are important characteristics of many markets subject to review by competition policy authorities. From this more representative model, I examine how specific market characteristics may influence the contracting decision and its impact on market prices. Since the impact 1 See Powell (1993) , Newbery (1998) , and Green (1999) . 2 Wolak (2000) , Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2004) . 3 See FERC (2004).
2 of contracts depends upon the parameters of the model, I present these impacts in the context of parameter values drawn from several existing electricity markets.
The implications of the model are that the presence of a market where firms trade fixed price contracts that are publicly acknowledged can significantly reduce the impact of horizontal market power. A forward contract has the effect of publicly committing one firm to produce more, thereby inducing its rivals to react by producing less. As each firm considers the effect of a forward contract on its rivals' output, the forward market effectively increases the conjectural variation by firms.
Since this is an oligopoly effect, there is no impact on a single firm market. The impact of a single forward market is weakest with relatively few competitors and increases rapidly with the number of firms. In fact for the case of constant marginal cost, the impact of introducing a single round of forward trading, as measured by the Lerner index, is equivalent to squaring the number of firms in the market. The relative impact of a forward market declines as the slope of marginal cost increases.
A linear demand model with n Cournot firms
Allaz and Vila develop a nested equilibrium model of duopolists engaging in foward and spot trading. They assume:
• Firms engage in Cournot competition Clearly the context in which forward markets exist is important to the implications of those markets for competition. The pro-competitive effects are likely to be strongest in markets for relatively homogenous commodities, where a finite number of publicly visible transactions play a significant role. Markets for electricity, crude-oil, gasoline, metals, and perhaps some agricultural products fit this description. Any realistic examination of even these markets requires extending the basic AV model.
In this section, I derive a variation of the AV model that incorporates a general linear demand function and an arbitrary number of symmetric firms with affine marginal costs. Market demand is modeled as Q t = a t − bp t , or p t = at−Qt b . For Cournot firm i, marginal cost is modeled as c(q i ) = K + c i q i . In the following subsections, I derive the equilibrium conditions for the spot market output of the Cournot firms. By nesting that spot market outcome within a 2 period model, I then derive the equilibrium level of forward market contracts.
Spot market
If firms have entered into forward contracts, then spot market profits will include a term q f i , denoting the forward position of firm i. The spot market profit of firm i is therefore
where Q = P j q j , is the total output of all Cournot firms. For a given set of demand parameters a and b, the Cournot equilibrium is characterized by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. If there are no contracts, the equilibrium is described by the following first order condition.
From this framework, I can state the first result of the model.
Lemma 1 Assume a market of symmetric Cournot producers with costs and demand as described above. For firm i, with contract level q f i ,the optimal production quantity, as a function of every firm's contract position, is
Proof. To demonstrate that the production level given in equation (1) constitutes an equilibrium, first consider any firm i. By aggregating (1) for all Cournot firms, total market production is
substituting (2) into the first order condition for firm i we have
solving for q i yields
which reduces to
If symmetry is extended to the forward market, with all q f i = q f , total market quantity and prices are therefore
The Contract Market
I now calculate the 1st period equilibrium assuming a single spot period. Following Allaz and Vila, I assume that there are no arbitrage opportunities. In other words, I assume that the forward price equals the spot price. The first order condition for maximizing the profit of firm i in the forward market with respect to contract level q f is
Using the marginal impact of quantity commitment that can be derived by differentiating (1) with respect to q f i , I can express the above conditon as
Note that the second term in the marginal revenue equation differs from the standard Cournot best response because the term
is not the same as the term
. In other words, the choice of contract level by firm i affects the spot market production of all other firms. Firm i is making a public and credible commitment to produce more by taking on contract level q f i , thereby leading to a reduction in spot production by other firms. This implies that a confidential agreement, although it would impact a firm's own spot production, would not have an impact on the production of other firms. Given this fact, risk neutral producers would prefer not to enter into confidential contracts (see Hughes and Kao, 1997) . From the above first order conditions, I derive the second result Proposition 1 For a symmetric market as described above, the equilibrium level of contracting by an individual Cournot firm in a single forward market will be
Proof. By substituting q i and Q = P j q j from (1) into (3), the first order condition for the 6 optimal contract quantity of firm i is
From symmetry, with all q f i = q f this reduces to
By collecting terms, this reduces to
Combining conditions (1) and (4) we have the following equilibrium spot quantities and prices.
Comparitive Statics
Given the above derivation, the ratio of production by Cournot suppliers that is sold forward is
This value rapidly increases in n between 2 and 8 suppliers and levels off in the range of 80-90%
of the volume being contracted.
By comparing the equilibrium quantities implied by (5) to those that would result if there were no contracting, we can derive the differential impact of the addition of a forward contracting round.
Corollary 1
The percent increase in output due to the existence of a single forward market is equal
Note that while the percent change in output is sensitive to the slope of the demand function, the effect is independent of the demand function intercept. Figure 1 graphs level sets of the above relationship. The impact on production quantity is uniformly decreasing in demand slope. For a very small number of firms (less than four) the quantity impact is increasing in n. For example, with a demand slope value of 40, increasing the number of firms from 2 to 3 raises the percent increase in output from contracting from less than 12% to close to over 13.5%. For more than about four firms the impact becomes decreasing in n.
Corollary 2 The change in the lerner index due to the existence of a foward market is equal to
The pro-competitive impact of forward contracting therefore depends upon the same factors that influence the competitiveness of the market absent a forward market. A natural question to examine is the extent to which the model predicts contracts offset an increase in market concentration. This is easiest to examine under an assumption of constant marginal cost (c = 0). increases. This is in part because at higher marginal costs, overall mark-ups are lower even in the absence of contracts. The scope for contracts to reduce margins is therefore lessened with steeper marginal cost.
Application to The Electricity Industry
Experiences with electricity industry liberalisation have varied greatly around the world. Differences in market design, regulatory oversight, and market structure no doubt play important roles in determining the relative performance of markets. However, much recent research points to the degree of vertical commitments between generation and retail as a key determinant of an electricity market's competitive performance. Most of the "successes" of electricity restructuring have fea-tured markets with either a large amount of long-term supply contracts between generators and retailers or a continued integration between generation and retail, with the retailer's ability to raise prices restricted by regulators or transition arrangements. By contrast, the California market was notorious for its lack of long-term arrangements between retailers and suppliers.
However, when one surveys the world's restructured electricity markets, a striking feature is the extent to which the degree of forward contracting has been driven by regulatory intervention.
Regulators in many markets required that long-term vesting or "buy-back" contracts be linked to the divestiture of generation assets. The non-utility producers who purchased these assets were obligated to provide power to the utilities that had previously provided the generation and who remained responsible for serving retail load. In other markets, such as Texas and the mid- has not developed as a robust competitive enterprise, with the possible exception of Texas. Thus, the vast majority of residential utility customers will continue to have their electricity acquired for them by their incumbent distribution company. Regulators who had at one point imagined that restructuring would eventually bring an end to retail rate regulation have instead been forced to confront the task of setting rates for distribution companies that are large buyers on the wholesale market. In doing so, regulators have had to balance the desire to provide incentives to minimize purchase costs with a need for the utilities to recover their wholesale cost. While a fixed rate structure can provide very powerful incentives to a distribution company, if they are set significantly below wholesale costs the inevitable result is a financial crisis, as it was in California. Conversely, a blanket pass-through of costs provides no incentive for utilities to either aggressively seek low prices or hedge their cost risk.
Most restructured markets in the U.S. are now turning toward a process of organized procurement by utilities with varying degrees of oversight by local regulators. In the northeast, utilities are sub-contracting the role of Provider of Last Resort (POLR) to energy service firms who agree to serve utility demand at a contracted price for a period ranging from 6 months to several years. In
California and other regions, it appears that the utility's role will be to directly acquire electricity supply from phyiscal producers.
The developments described above form the background to the stylized model developed in this section. The institutional framework I have in mind is a single procurement round, either through auction or a less formal process, that is reasonably transparent because of regulatory participation. This is in contrast to the short-term trading that goes on between utilities, suppliers, and speculative trading firms that is for the most part not publicly transparent. As described above, the public commitment of a physical producer to a retail supplier can play the role of a credible commitment to raise production, thereby causing competitors without such commitments to reduce output.
The procurement occurs in an oligopoly environment with a finite number of producers capable of providing supply to the distribution company.
Empirical Model
Given the results of the theory model in Section 2 it is natural to ask what kind of pro-competitive impact a single contracting round would have on actual electricity markets. I utilize the theory model developed above to address this question. Using detailed data from several markets, I distill the supply and demand characteristics to match the framework of the theory model. I then demonstrate the results of the theory model for the range of parameter values taken from these markets.
I first calculate a term for the equivalent number of firms in a market by calculating a Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration statistic for the major thermal suppliers in a market and then mapping it to the equivalent number of symmetric firms that would generate the same HHI value.
Supply costs are taken from aggregating the thermal generation within the control area to form a single supply function. Acutal supply costs are simplified to fit the affine function of the theory model. 4 The aggregate supply function is then subdivided into n affine supply functions according to the number of equivalent firms in a market.
Estimating Residual Demand
Demand is estimated from historic market data. I utilize a method similar to that used in For each hour t, I represent the production from fringe supply using daily temperature in bordering states (T emp st ), 6 and fixed effects for hour h of the day (Hour ht ) and day j of week (Day jt ). For each market and year, I estimate fringe supply (q f ringe t ) as a function of the actual market price p t , proxies for cost shocks (fixed effects for month i of the summer (Month it )), proxies 4 Thermal generation costs are taken from previous empirical work studying these markets. For each market, previous work has estimated the market-wide marginal cost of serving demand for all observed demand levels. For more details see Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) , Mansur (2003) , and Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia (2004) . These studies produce hourly MC -demand relationships. I regress MC on production quantity for each market to derive the constant (k) and slope (c) terms shown in Table 1 5 In California, this supply includes net imports and must-take plants (see Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002 ). These plants include nuclear and independent power producers. In New England, net imports from New York and production from small firm generation comprise this supply (see Bushnell and Saravia, 2002) . I estimate only net import supply in PJM as small independent generation sources are negligable in that region. 6 For California, this includes Arizona, Oregon, and Nevada. New York is the only state bordering New England, while in PJM, bordering states include New York, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia. The temperature variables for bordering states are modeled as quadratic functions for cooling degree days (degrees daily mean below 65
• F) and heating degree days (degrees daily mean above 65
• F). As such T empst has four variables for each bordering state. These data are state averages from the NOAA web site daily temperature data.
for neighboring prices (T emp st , Day jt , Hour ht ), and an idiosyncratic shock (ε t ):
As price is endogenous, I estimate (7) using two stage least squares (2SLS) and instrument using hourly quantity demanded. The instrument is the natural log of hourly quantity demanded inside each respective ISO system. Typically quantity demanded is considered endogenous to price, however, since the derived demand for wholesale electricity is completely inelastic, this unusual instrument choice is valid in this case. I exclude demand from the second stage as it only indirectly affects net imports through prices. Table 1 describes the relevant market parameters for the 3 markets studied. Table 2 presents the results of the residual demand elasticity regressions. California experienced a dramatic reduction in imports during 2000 that also resulted in a much lower residual elasticity compared to 1999.
The PJM market, which is roughly comparable in size to California and is twice the size of New England, imports very little power and has very few small producers. PJM had the smallest fringe elasticity of the markets studied. The increase in natural gas prices during 2000 is reflected in the higher cost terms for New England and California for that year relative to 1999. Table 3 presents the implications of the model for contracting and competition. The contracting levels predicted by the model are relatively similar to those actually in place in 1999, with the important exception of California. The relative inelasticity of residual demand in the PJM market is offset by the higher number of firms. The presence of contracting in PJM is therefore most important. Impact is greatest in relatively low elasticity environments with modest concentration of supply.
Relative value of contracting vs. demand elasticity
The above theoretical results, as well as the empirical literature on electricity markets indicate that markets with the best competitive performance are those where the large retailers, who are the buyers on the wholesale market, pursued vertical arrangements with suppliers. At the same time,
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both theoretical work and empirical simulations support the argument that increasing the elasticity of end-use demand through a wide-spread implementation of the real-time pricing of electricity to end users would have substantial pro-competitive effects, in addition to providing other benefits. 7 These two effects would, at first glance, appear to be at odds with each-other. On the one hand, there are pro-competitive benefits from retailers entering into long-term vertical arrangements with
suppliers. Yet in the absence of retail competition, the strongest motivation a retailer could have for entering into such arrangements would be regulatory restraints on the ability of that retailer to adjust customer tariffs in response to wholesale price shocks. If retailers are simply allowed to completely pass on wholesale price shocks, as they would in a pure real-time pricing environment, their incentive to hedge wholesale price risk is greatly reduced if not eliminated. Of course enduse customers would now have a stronger incentive to hedge wholesale price risk, but this group constitutes a much more disparate collection of small consumers many of whom spend relatively small amounts of their individual budgets on electricity.
Borenstein ( In every market, the value of a round of contracting is equivalent to a massive increase in demand elasticity. Adding contracting is equivalent to a 400% increase in elasticity in California and a 600% increase in PJM.
Conclusion
Traditionally, competition policy has operated with a focus on market structure, particularly the forward contracting is equivalent to a major increase in demand elasticity in terms of its effect on mitigating the market power of Cournot producers. These results imply that in markets where fixed price forward trading is common, the importance of firm size is greatly magnified. Notes: Table presents 2SLS coefficients. First we estimate 2SLS and use the errors to correct for serial correlation by estimating an AR(1) coefficient (ρ). Then we quasi-difference the data by calculating ∆x = x t − ρx t−1 for all data. We re-estimate the 2SLS results using these quasi-differenced data. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance is marked with (*) at the 5% level and ( # ) at the 10% level.
Regression includes fixed effects for month of year, day of week, and hour of day. Also weather variables for bordering states are included and modeled as quadratic functions for cooling degree days (degrees daily mean below 65
• F) and heating degree days (degrees daily mean above 65 • F). In the first stage, we regress price on the exogenous variables of hourly load (MWh) in each market. Table presents alternative values of demand slope,b which equilibrate a no-contract Cournot price from each market with the price produced from 1 round of contracting using the original demand slope, b from each market. The alternative slope is applied to a demand curve that passes through the "with contracts" equilibrium price and quantity. Elasticity is calculated at the Cournot equilibrium prices and quantities based upon the average of the 25 highest quantity hours from June 1999 or Sept. 2000. 
